

5 Oct 1970

BRIEFING NOTICE

CD/EUR  
CD/MEA

DDCI's agenda for PFIAB Friday morning, 11:10-12:20, after a couple of items that aren't our responsibility, reads as follows:

"c. Any personal views the DCI or the DDCI may have with respect to the Middle East situation;

"d. Any personal views the DCI or the DDCI may have on the use of intelligence in the formulation and execution of foreign policy with emphasis on execution."

We are trying to get amplification of (d), which appears on the surface to be either an improper question we shouldn't answer, or a naive one calling for a primer on how intelligence supports policy, or a ho-hum request for a postmortem on any situation we prefer to dissect. For the moment, forget it.

STATINTL

On (c), however, the need is for DDCI to give some general overall prognosis on the Middle East [REDACTED] will have covered current situation in depth the day before,) and I suggest something along the following lines. Can you provide me with the necessary material for your respective sections by midday Tuesday, please?

I. You gentlemen are up to date on the current situation in the Middle East, and I can think of only two elements I would like to touch on. One is what the Soviet assessment of the Middle East may be at present, and the other is some broad speculation on what is likely to happen there in the coming months.

II. It has been our analysis that the Soviets, since they first established themselves in the Middle East with their agreement to build the Aswan Dam, have been intent on developing their own long-term influence at the expense of the Western presence etc etc etc Sov behavior during Jordanian crisis, namely X, Y, and Z, gives us no reason to change that assessment. They have, however, a major problem at present, and that is question of who will succeed Nasir. Sovs can hardly hope it will be a man who can carry as much of Arab world with him as Nasir has from time to time. For the moment,

can maintain order in Egypt and at the same time recognize--from their viewpoint--the value and the necessity of Soviet help, and the fact that he must be amenable to a degree of Soviet influence in return for it. etc etc etc

SOV  
Soviets ideally would prefer a continuing level ~~of~~ of tension in the Middle East, because it sustains the rationale for their presence, puts West in a bind, and creates an atmosphere in which they can also make some ideological ground, but just as we ~~don't~~ believe they will exercise what control they can to prevent the renewed outbreak of major hostilities at this time, they will also do what they can to sustain viable client regimes. Their reluctance to deal with the fedayeen indicates Soviets do not see any benefit in progressing from tension to chaos.

III. As for the outlook in the Middle East, the death of Nasir has had an impact on virtually every major problem in an area which was inherently unstable even with his leadership.

1. Cease-fire with Israel---successors will probably want to renew, but don't have the clout to make any concessions, reach any agreements and bring rest of Arabs along with them. Even within Egypt, surviving leaders have been frank to say they need army and army wouldn't stand for any "~~xxx~~rectifications."

2. Couple of groups on what Israelis now think of their previously reported belief that anything would be better than Nasir.

3. Even affects Jordan. Husayn ~~was~~ had his disagreements with Nasir, but Nasir saved his bacon several times, and played a role in keeping all the Arabs from lining up with the fedayeen against Husayn.

4. Who's going to beat some sense into Qaddafi from time to time?

5. In a word, whoever replaces N running Egypt, and whoever replaces him as ~~an~~ Arab leader, the scene has lost a man who could--when the spirit moved him--moderate the Arab radicals.

STATINTL

Foregoing, of course, is just a suggested scenario. DDCI can use 4 or 5 minutes from the Sov shop, 8 to 10 from Arabs, but would also settle for less.

*Qaddafi*  
Nasser successor?  
Suez Canal free?  
Jordan?  
Fedayeen?

*clear- free out*

STATINTL

*Jordan -*

*no problem about*



STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: PFI A-3

7 hrs - Fri

Brief Thurs - 8 9:15-1030

- 1) Current intelligence on M.E.
- 2) Collection Cap on M.E.
- 3) Monitoring of close - fire

Friday 9 (Cushman)

- 1) Personal views - where do we go

20 min each MAX (DATE)

2) Use of Intelligence in Formulation

ATT BUILD

EXAMPLES

FORM NO. 101-1 AUG 54 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

101

JORDAN

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

 $a + b =$ 

Filb. Amendment  
Watchdog

c) Personal Views on ME

d) on use of

Make it clear how long ~~restraint~~  
make it diff & conduct foreign  
pol in places like SEA + Calz.

— d using ME as example

- How it was used by pol. makers